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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellant Maria Duran is from a final order of the
Labor Commission of Utah dated November 30, 2006. This Court has jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16, and 78-2a3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Did the Labor Commission properly deny Ms. Duran's motion to set-aside

default and proceed to hear the merits of the case when Petitioner filed a Withdrawal of
her Application for Hearing only hours prior to the evidentiary hearing without giving
notice to opposing counsel? This issue was preserved at Rule 213 et al.
Standard of Review: A court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion
in granting or denying a motion to set a default judgment aside. See Board of Educ. v.
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963). A trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default
involves the trial court's discretionary power, and the Court of Appeals will not disturb
the trial court's decision in such matters absent a clear abuse of such discretion. See
Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

Issue: Did the Commission properly dismiss this case "with prejudice" when

Petitioner failed to attend the long-scheduled evidentiary hearing and present evidence to
support her claim and, when, based upon the resulting hearing record, Administrative

1

Law Judge Marlowe found that Petitioner was not entitled to further benefits? This issue
was preserved at Rule 213 et al.
Standard of Review: The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows this court
to grant relief where the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law,"
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), or where "the statute or rule on which the agency
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(a). "When reviewing an application or interpretation of law we use a correction of
error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's interpretation of the law."
Discretion is granted to the Commission's "application of the law to particular facts only
when 'there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the language in question,
either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language.'" In this case,
whether the Commission properly dismissed a case "with prejudice" involves a correction
of error standard of review as no discretion has been granted under the applicable Utah
statute. See Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
There is no determinative appellate law. However, several statutes and rules are
applicable.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-ll provides:
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the
adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or participate
in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; oRule..
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default and
shall be mailed to all parties.
(3)

(a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the
default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(4)

(a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative
proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party in
default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default,
conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative
proceeding without the participation of the party in default and shall
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those
affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the agency
and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of
default, dismiss the proceeding.

Id.
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Utah Rule Civ. Proc. 41 provides:
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof
(1) By plaintiff Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(1), and of any
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of
any state an action based on or including the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; oRule
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may
then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for
4

lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Id. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2)(a)(vii) provides:
if the administrative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required
by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and
a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may
be held in default.
Id. (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4) provides:
(4)(a)(i). Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, the Division
of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the employee's claim
should not be dismissed because the employee has failed to meet the employee's
burden of proof to establish an entitlement to compensation claimed in the
application for hearing.
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(I) may be entered on the motion of
the:
(A) Division of Adjudication;
(B) employee's employer; or
(C) employer's insurance carrieRule
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a claim:
(i) without prejudice; or
(ii) with prejudice only if:
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates themerits of the
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application for
5

hearing; or
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii).
Id. (Emphasis added).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question of whether the Utah Labor Commission properly
determined that an employee who files for worker's compensation benefits cannot
withdraw her Application for Hearing only hours before trial without leave of the court.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals must consider whether the Commission, upon
reviewing the merits of this case, properly dismissed this case "with prejudice".
Course of the Proceedings / Statement of Facts
1.

On January 23, 2004, Ms. Duran ("Petitioner"), through legal counsel Virginius
Dabney, filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission seeking
entitlement to workers' compensation benefits arising from an alleged accident on
January 1, 2003 while working for Shoney's Restaurant. She alleged that she
slipped on juice, but did not fall, while carrying plates, with injuries to her spine
and lower extremities. (Rule, 1.)

2.

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed an Answer to the Application for Hearing.
Respondents denied the injuries alleged by Petitioner. (Rule, 26).

3.

On January 6, 2005, the Labor Commission set this matter for hearing in St.
George on April 26, 2005 at 1:00 p.m. (Rule, 30). That notice stated:
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"YOU MUST NOTIFY US WITHIN 10 DAYS IF YOU WANT TO
CHANGE THE TIME OR DATE, OTHERWISE YOU WILL BE
REQUIRED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE. If you fail to appear at the time
your case is to be heard, your case may be dismissed or you may be
defaulted."
Id- (Emphasis in original.)
4.

On January 26, 2005, petitioner's counsel, Virginius Dabney, wrote to Judge
Marlowe indicating that a ". . . . half day may not be long enough so I would
appreciate a setting for a full day. However, we do not want to give up the halfday setting if there is no full day available. We want to have the hearing because
the case has been pending for so long." (Rule, 31)

5.

On February 7, 2005, the Court informed the parties that the hearing would
proceed on April 26, 2005, with an additional date given later if necessary. (Rule,
32)

6.

On March 11, 2005, Mr. Dabney again requested a full day for the hearing. (Rule,
37). In a hand-written response dated March 16, 2005, Judge Marlowe again
indicated that she would go forward on the scheduled half day, with any remaining
evidence to be presented in Salt Lake City or on the next St. George calendar, if
necessary. (Rule, 37)

7.

On March 16, 2005, Mr. Dabney again wrote to Judge Marlowe requesting a full
day for a hearing. (Rule, 38).

8

On March 18, 2005, counsel for respondents objected to a continuance, noting that
only three witnesses had been identified for the hearing: Ms. Duran, Ken Lister,
and Louise Randall (a manager from Shoney's). With only three nominated
witnesses, respondents' counsel argued that the case should not last longer than
three hours, let alone the four hours as scheduled. (Rule, 40).
On April 8, 2005, Respondents filed a Motion to preclude Petitioner's expert
witness from testifying on the basis that Petitioner had refused to provide an
outline of testimony of that witness or otherwise make the witness available to be
deposed. (Rule, 62).
On April 22, 2005, petitioner's counsel again requested that the case be
rescheduled for a full day of hearing. (Rule, 75).
On April 22, 2005 the ALJ granted Respondents' motion to exclude Petitioner's
expert witness. (Rule, 77).
Late in the afternoon of April 25, 2005, on or about 2:30 pm (the day prior to the
scheduled hearing), Mr. Dabney faxed a letter to the Labor Commission indicating
that petitioner was withdrawing her Application for Hearing. Petitioner did not
request permission to withdraw; rather the letter simply notified the ALJ of this
intent. Petitioner indicated that she would file an Amended Application for
Hearing in order to allow Mr. Lister, a vocational expert, to testify on behalf of
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petitioner.1 (Rule, 81.) Judge Marlowe had already left Salt Lake City for the
hearing and did not receive the letter.
13.

Mr. Dabney did not provide notice to Respondents' counsel relative to the
withdrawal of the claim. To the contrary, even petitioner's fax shows that it did
not successfully transmit to respondents' counsel. (Rule, 82)

14.

On April 26, 2005, Respondents' counsel traveled from Salt Lake City to St.
George for the scheduled hearing. At the time of the scheduled hearing, Judge
Marlowe informed respondents' counsel of the withdrawal of the Application for
Hearing. The issues outlined in Willard v. Thurston Cable. Labor Commission 980569 (7/29/02) were addressed and, since neither petitioner nor her counsel were
present, petitioner's default was entered. In addition, Judge Marlowe conducted
an evidentiary hearing whereby the court took sworn testimony from Louise
Randall, Shoney's manager. Ms. Randall testified that Shoney's will close in May
2005, having sold out to Ruby River. Ms. Randall also brought evidence with her
to court which included forty-five plates from Shoney's- the number of plates
allegedly being carried by Petitioner at the time of her accident. A transcript of
that hearing is provided at Rule, 213.

!

The court had previously excluded Mr. Lister as a witness since petitioner's counsel
had not provided to respondents a summary of Mr. Lister's proposed testimony, had not made
Mr. Lister available to be deposed on a timely basis, and had not objected to respondents'
Motion to Exclude Mr. Lister as a witness.
10

15.

At the hearing, Respondents counsel noted that there was no reason why Petitioner
nor her attorney, both St. George residents, could not attend the hearing.
Respondents stressed that both Respondents' legal counsel and the ALJ had
traveled from Salt Lake City to St. George for this hearing. Respondents also noted
that they had brought evidence and a witness that may be otherwise unavailable if
the hearing was continued. (Rule, 213).

16.

On May 3, 2005, Judge Marlowe entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order detailing nearly 10 pages. Based upon her review of the medical
records and the testimony of Ms. Randall, Judge Marlowe denied any further
benefits to petitioner. (Rule, 83-91).2 The ALJ stated in her Order that a default
order was appropriate under section 63-46b-11 of the Utah Code since Petitioner
failed to appear at the hearing. The ALJ also agreed that, under Rule 41 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Labor Commission precedent, Petitioner was

2

In fact, the medical records show very little support, if any for Petitioner's claim.
An MRI taken of her lumber spine on May 5, 2003 returned normal. See Rule, 212, at 52.
Additionally, an MRI taken of her cervical spine show only minor degenerative changes. See
Rule, 212, at 51. In addition, Petitioner did not begin to complain of neck pain for four
months after the claimed industrial accident. See Rule, 212, at 49, 51. Even Petitioner's
treating doctor opined that her neck condition "could" be related to work, an opinion which
does not satisfy the medical probability standard and is, at best, speculative. See Rule, 212,
at 49. Even a chiropractor, Dr. Labrum, found that Petitioner was able to return to work in
January 2003. See Rule, 212, 23. Nonetheless, temporary total disability benefits were paid
to Petitioner well after this stability date until Dr. Richard Knoebel saw Petitioner on August
26, 2003. See Rule, 212 at 34-46. Hence, there is arguably a large overpayment of
temporary total disability in this case.
11

required to receive permission from the court to withdraw her Application for
Hearing and could not unilaterally do so by her letter of April 25, 2005. The ALJ
ruled that she would treat Petitioner's letter as a motion to withdraw the
Application for Hearing. Finding no good reason for Petitioner to withdraw her
Application for Hearing, the ALJ denied the motion and proceeded with the
hearing. Upon considering the merits, the ALJ ultimately denied further benefits.
(Rule, 83-91).
17.

On June 3, 2005, petitioner filed her Motion for Review. (Rule, 92).

18.

On June 22, 2005, respondents filed a memorandum in opposition to petitioner's
Motion for Review. (Rule, 102).

19.

On July 7, 2005, Judge Marlowe, treating petitioner's Motion for Review as a
Motion to Set Aside Default, entered an Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Set
Aside Default. (Rule, 136).

20.

On July 29, 2005, petitioner filed a reply memorandum in response to the
memorandum filed by respondents. (Rule, 141).

21.

On July 29, 2005, petitioner also filed a second Motion for Review of Judge
Marlowe's Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default. (Rule, 139).

22.

On November 30, 2006, the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision. (Rule, 207).

12

23.

On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Review and Docketing
Statement. Following unsuccessful mediation, petitioner's brief was set for May
4, 2007.

24.

On April 30, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and
supporting memorandum.

25.

On May 16, 2007 the Court denied Petitioner's Motion.

26.

On July 30, 2007 Petitioner filed her Appellate Brief with the Court of Appeals.

13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was no error by the Commission in dismissing Petitioner's case with
prejudice. Under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner was required to
have permission of the court to withdraw her Application for Hearing and could not
unilaterally do so by her letter of April 25, 2005. Even assuming that Petitioner's letter
of April 25, 2005 was properly treated as a motion to withdraw the Application for
Hearing (although not phrased as a motion), the ALJ appropriately determined that
Petitioner's purported reason to withdraw her Application for Hearing -based upon the
fact that she wanted a full day hearing — was inadequate, and she properly denied the
motion to withdraw and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing. Since Petitioner failed to
attend the hearing, despite having proper notice, an Order of Default was fittingly entered
under section 63-46b-11 of the Utah Code. Additionally, the Court appropriately
proceeded to conduct further proceedings by hearing the merits of this case as allowed by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 1(4). Having heard the case on the merits, and finding no
further benefits appropriate in this case, the ALJ properly denied benefits to Petitioner
and entered a dismissal with prejudice as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2417(4)(b)(ii)(A).

14

ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

THE COMMISSION PROPERLY RULED THAT MS. DURAN DOES
NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW HER
APPLICATION FOR HEARING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE
WITHDRAWAL OCCURS LESS THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE
SCHEDULED HEARING WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE TO
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Ms. Duran submits that the Utah Labor Commission erred in upholding the ALJ's
entry of default and proceeding to hear the case on the merits since "long standing
commission custom and practice" allows an applicant, at any time, to withdraw an
Application for Hearing prior to hearing. Indeed, Petitioner argues that the Labor
Commission committed error in dismissing her case with prejudice since she filed a
Withdrawal of the Application for Hearing, albeit only hours prior to the scheduled
hearing. In other words, Petitioner essentially argues that it is somehow appropriate for
the Labor Commission to allow the ALJ, opposing counsel, the parties, and the witnesses
in a case to prepare for and to travel to a hearing and, only hours before the hearing, to
permit the petitioner, without notice to opposing counsel, to withdraw the claim, without
prejudice, with the expressly stated intent to re-file immediately with the Commission the
exact same claim.
Petitioner cites two Labor Commission decisions, Willard v. Thurston Cable, Case
No. 98-0568 (7/29/02), and Barton v. St. George Steel 97-0887 (11/29/00) to support her
position that "long standing custom and practice" allows voluntary withdrawal of the
15

Application for Hearing on the day before trial. This allegation, of course, is not correct.
In fact, the Commission in Willard squarely addresses this issue and supports
Respondents' position lhat, once an answer or responsive pleading is filed, judicial
approval is needed before an applicant may withdraw his or her Application for Hearing.
In Willard, the claimant filed a "Withdrawal of Application for Hearing Without
Prejudice" purporting to withdraw his Application for Hearing on the grounds that he was
incarcerated and could not participate in the adjudicative process. The ALJ cancelled the
hearing without giving the opposing party the opportunity to respond. The Commission
held that the ALJ erred in allowing the unilateral withdrawal of the Application for
Hearing. The court cited to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure noting that Rule
41(a) allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action unilaterally at any time prior to the
opposing party's answer or other response. The Commission further cited to Rule 41(b)
which indicates that where an Answer has already been filed, "an action may only be
dismissed .... based either on: (i) stipulation of the parties who have appeared in the
action; or (ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper..."
In Willard, the Commission ultimately concluded:
"In view of the foregoing provisions of Rule 41, and in the absence of any
stipulation for dismissal between the parties, the Commission concludes that
Commission permission is required before Mr. Willard may withdraw his
Application for Hearing in this matter."
Id. (Emphasis added).
16

In the present case, petitioner Duran blanketly argues that she has an unconditional
right to withdraw her Application for Hearing at any time, prior to the actual hearing, with
or without notice to opposing counsel and with or without permission from the Labor
Commission. She argues that the Commission's decision in Willard, is not applicable to
her case, arguing that long standing "Commission custom" allows the withdrawal of
Applications for Hearing at any time.
Petitioner's analysis is seriously flawed. The Labor Commission's ruling in
Willard applies specifically to any case where a petitioner seeks to voluntarily withdraw
an Application for Hearing prior to the scheduled hearing. The Labor Commission's
analysis is clearly set forth in Willard. Moreover, respondents specifically deny the
existence of a "Commission custom" of allowing a withdrawal of the claim at any time
prior to a hearing. Willard, decided by the Labor Commission in 2002, itself stands to the
contrary of that proposition. Petitioner has failed to cite to any Labor Commission ruling
indicating that one may simply withdraw an Application for Hearing the day prior to a
scheduled hearing. Even if there had been such a "custom" prior to 2002 (which
Respondents deny), that "custom" was expressly revoked by the Labor Commission's
decision in Willard.
In this case, since an Answer was filed and, in fact, the hearing was only hours
away, Petitioner was required to obtain permission of the ALJ to withdraw her

17

Application for Hearing. Since the court did not grant her leave to withdraw, she was
under a clear obligation to appear at the hearing.

POINT 2:

THE COMMISSION WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN NOT
ACCEPTING PETITIONER'S VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF HER
APPLICATION FOR HEARING.

The Commission did not commit error in holding that it would not accept
Petitioner's voluntary dismissal of her Application for Hearing. As noted, under Rule 41
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of a stipulation by the parties,
Commission permission is required before a petitioner may obtain dismissal of their legal
action. Such action may only be dismissed "upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper". See Utah Rule Civ. P. 41. Petitioner fails to show why the reasons given
in the ALJ's Order of May 3, 2005 constitute error. Additionally, Petitioner failed to even
attend the hearing to explain why leave would be appropriate. In fact, Judge Marlowe
had sufficient grounds for denying petitioner's motion to withdraw which was affirmed
by the Commission:
First Judge Marlowe correctly noted that the motion to withdraw had only been
faxed to the Labor Commission on the day prior to the scheduled hearing at 2:39 p.m.
Obviously, Judge Marlowe was concerned with the late notice having been provided to
the Commission regarding the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing.

18

Second, Judge Marlowe noted that the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing
had never been sent to respondents' counsel. This finding is supported by the evidence
attached to petitioner's own Motion for Review, indicating that petitioner's attempted fax
to Blackburn & Stoll was not successful.
Third, due to the lack of notice to respondents' counsel, a large expense was
incurred on behalf of respondents. In this regard, counsel for respondents spent a great
deal of time on April 25, 2005 preparing for the hearing. Counsel for respondents also
incurred the cost of flying to St. George on April 26 and renting a car in order to appear at
the scheduled hearing. Respondents also had to incur the legal fees of having Mr. Dyer
spend a day in St. George for the hearing and meet with and prepare his witness for
hearing.
Fourth, Judge Marlowe noted that Louise Randall appeared as a witness to testify
on behalf of respondents. However, in her testimony, Ms. Randall noted that Shoney's
had already been sold to Ruby River and would be closing within a month's time. Thus,
the withdrawal of the Application for Hearing could significantly jeopardize the
availability of respondents' witness.3
Fifth, it appears that Petitioner has already been compensated to the extent allowed
by the Worker's Compensation Act for any injuries from this accident. The medical

Respondents note that it has now been two years since Shoney's closed in St. George.
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evidence presented at hearing revealed that following the January 1, 2003 accident
Petitioner continued to work until January 6, 2003. Dr. Labrum found her unable to work
from January 6, 2003 until January 155 2003 and he then released her to return to work.
Despite this release, Respondents continued to pay temporary total disability to Petitioner
until August 26, 2003 when she was evaluated by Dr. Knoebel. At that time, Dr. Knoebel
found her to be medically stable with no permanent partial disability. He also noted that
there were no significant objective findings by x-ray or MRI. Based upon these records,
ALJ Marlowe would have been justified in terminating temporary total disability on
January 15, 2003. However, she generously continued those benefits to Petitioner
through August 26, 2003. See Rule, 88.
Additionally, the MRI of Petitioner's back on May 3, 2005 returned normal. See
Rule, 212 at 53. Based upon this MRI, Judge Marlowe was also justified in not awarding
any permanent partial disability for Petitioner's lumbar spine. Likewise, Petitioner did
not complain of cervical problems for nearly four months after the accident. Her treating
doctor, Dr. Smith, opined that this condition "could be" related to the industrial event.
See Rule, 212, at 49. Thus, based upon medical possibility, Judge Marlowe was again
justified in not awarding permanent partial disability. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 96 Utah 510 (1939) (holding that while finding of the Commission may not rest
on possibilities, it may properly rest on probabilities).
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Sixth, Judge Marlowe noted that Louise Randall had brought with her forty-five
plates from Shoney's Restaurant as evidence for the hearing. (In her deposition,
petitioner claimed that she was carrying forty-five plates at the time of her slip.)
However, due to the closure of Shoney's, respondents would be seriously disadvantaged
at not having available the same evidence.
Petitioner now argues that Judge Marlowe and the Commission did not adequately
weigh the reasons for withdrawal. She argues that she was deprived of the ability to fully
explain and substantiate the reasons for the withdrawal of the claim.
In response to the arguments raised by petitioner, respondents note initially that
petitioner did, in fact, have notice of the scheduled hearing. Had she wanted to appear to
discuss the matter before Judge Marlowe, she certainly could have done so. Petitioner
and her counsel both live in St. George and, should they have desired, could have
appeared at the hearing by means of a five minute drive. Thus, if petitioner was deprived
of the ability to explain the reason for the withdrawal of her claim, that deprivation was
certainly self-inflicted. She chose not to appear at the scheduled hearing, and she did so
at her own peril. Additionally, Petitioner's placement of blame on the ALJ is meritless.
Petitioner places blame on the ALJ in failing to rule immediately on her notice of
withdrawal, noting that had the judge promptly ruled, she would have been on notice to
appear. Obviously, any intent to inform Petitioner of an immediately ruling would not
have been possible since Petitioner did not attend the hearing. Nonetheless, Petitioner did
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not frame her April 25, 2005 letter as a "motion". Rather, the April 22, 2005 letter filed
by Petitioner is simply a notice to the court that she was withdrawing her claim. The
judge kindly treated this letter as a motion, although she clearly was not required by law
to do so. See Rule, 81.
Moreover, even if Petitioner had appeared at the hearing, the purported basis for
the withdrawal of the claim is insufficient from a legal standpoint. According to
petitioner's letter of April 25, 2005, she was withdrawing her Application for Hearing in
order to file an Amended Application for Hearing which could allow Mr. Lister to testify
on behalf of petitioner In this regard, petitioner is clearly attempting to obtain a "second
bite at the apple." Petitioner did not cooperate in discovery, nor did she respond to
respondents' motion to exclude Mr. Lister from testifying.4 Thus, petitioner's true reason
for withdrawing her Application for Hearing was that she was not prepared for the
hearing, having disdained following appropriate legal rules for preparing for trial. This is
not a situation when emergent circumstances prevented Petitioner and her attorney's
attendance at hearing. Petitioner and her attorney, both residents of St. George, simply
chose not to attend the scheduled hearing, knowing that both the ALJ and respondents'
legal counsel had to travel from Salt Lake City to St. George to attend the hearing.

4

Judge Marlowe noted in her Order that, in a letter dated April 22,2005, Mr. Dabney
explained that he had "neither the time nor the interest to respond" to the Motion.
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Certainly, Petitioner and her attorney's legal delay tactics in this case should not be
rewarded.
Respondents respectfully submit that, on balance, Judge Marlowe and the
Commission were justified in denying petitioner's motion to withdraw her Application for
Hearing on the day prior to the scheduled hearing. The Commission's affirmance of
Judge Marlowe's Order certainly does not constitute error.

POINT 3:

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S CASE
"WITH PREJUDICE" SINCE THE CASE WAS HEARD ON THE
MERITS.

Petitioner also argues that the Commission is not allowed to enter a dismissal
"with prejudice" based upon a default. However, petitioner was not merely defaulted;
rather, a hearing was held on the merits with medical records reviewed by the judge and
hearing testimony taken. Because petitioner did not prove the prima facie elements
necessary to support her claims, dismissal of her case "with prejudice" was allowed
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(b)(ii)(A) since this claim was heard on the
merits.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(4)(b)(ii)(A) provides:
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, the
Division of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee has failed
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to meet the employee's burden of proof to establish an entitlement to
compensation claimed in the application for hearing.
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on the
motion of the:
(A) Division of Adjudication;
(B) employee's employer; or
(C) employer's insurance carrier.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a claim:
(i) without prejudice; or
(ii) with prejudice only if:
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the application
for hearing; or
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii).

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-3 and -11 provide for the entry and
penalty of a default when a party fails to properly attend or participate in a properly
scheduled evidentiary hearing. Section 63-46b-3(2)(a)(vii) of the Utah Code states:
if the administrative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required
by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any scheduled
hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and
a statement thai a party who fails to attend or participate in the hearing may
be held in default.
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Id. (Emphasis added).
The Notice from the Labor Commission in this case fully complied with the above
strictures and was not deficient in any way, stating that a default may be entered if the
parties fail to attend or participate in the hearing. Because this Labor Commission form
fully complies with the Utah Code, petitioner's argument lacks merit. In any event,
petitioner's attorney, a seasoned practitioner for over 20+ years, should be familiar with
the Utah Code and other applicable Utah Worker's Compensation laws and should know
that the failure to participate in a hearing could subject his client to default.5
In this case, a hearing had been scheduled since January 6, 2005 and was known
by the parties. The last hour withdrawal in this case constitutes dilatory action and/or
intentional manipulation by Attorney Dabney and his client. To allow a default under the
circumstances of this case to result merely in a dismissal "without prejudice" - as
proposed by petitioner -- would be more than unjust: it should shock the conscience of the
court. Petitioner's proposed "solution" will cause the potential for extreme delay and
enormous expense to respondents in every single case since any counsel for a petitioner,
if not feeling entirely prepared in any given case, could simply withdraw the claim only
hours before the scheduled hearing. Respondents urge the Court to reject petitioner's

5

Petitioner's counsel has also been defaulted for this same practice by other ALJ's in
other cases. See, e.g. Thiel v. Jack B. Parsons, case number 04-0058 (6-16-06) and Nelson
v. Canyon. 05-0394 (10-3-05).
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request for unfettered discretion relative to withdrawing an Application for Hearing at the
Labor Commission.
Utah's appellate courts have considered similar issues in Panos v. Smith's Food &
Drug Ctrs.. 913 P.2d 363, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). There, the court cited Rule 41(b) and
held:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against him. . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or
for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
Utah Rule Civ. P. 41(b).
Although the express language of Rule 41(b) states a defendant must bring
a motion to dismiss to enforce a court order, we have ruled that a court may
dismiss a claim sua sponte, without a motion by the defendant. "The
language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not requires, a motion by defendant.
. . . 'In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed
under [Rule 41(b)], or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end."' . .
.Therefore, under Rule 41(b), a trial court may dismiss claims with or
without prejudice absent a motion by defendants.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, 63-46b-8 of the Utah Code "does not preclude the presiding officer
from taking appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the hearing." The Labor
Commission's powers under the Utah Code (and UAPA) in conjunction with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure certainly give the AL J the discretion to impose the sanction of
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dismissal with or without prejudice against a party who has failed to attend a properly
scheduled hearing and who has engaged in dilatory and contumacious behavior.
Respondents also note that the inherent powers of this tribunal permit the ALJ and
Board to dismiss a case with prejudice and to award sanctions. In Barnard v. Wasserman,
855 P.2d 243 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court stated:
It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction
possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these
are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules
for the regulation of the business before the court,... to recall and control
its process, to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such,
and to suspend, disbar, and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of
courts are necessary to the proper discharge of their duties. . . .
The summary jurisdiction which the court has over its attorneys as officers
of the court... is inherent, continuing, and plenary . . . and ought to be
assumed and exercised . . . not only to maintain and protect the integrity and
dignity of the court, to secure obedience to its rules and process, and to
rebuke interference with the conduct of its business, but also to control and
protect its officers, including attorneys. . . . Courts of general jurisdiction . .
.possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on
attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and
movement of cases through the court.
14 (emphasis added); see Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d 255 (same).

In Barnard, the Supreme Court held that because Mr. Barnard's actions as an
attorney interfered with the administration of justice and wasted the court's time, the trial
court had the authority to sanction him. The Supreme Court explained that "[although
not explicitly provided for by rule, such awards are within the inherent powers of the
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court and are in fact imposed regularly as a means of controlling the conduct of attorneys
and litigants/' Barnard, supra.
Similarly, in Griffith, the Supreme Court held that sanctions, while available under
Rule 11 under limited circumstances, were properly awarded by the trial court under its
"inherent powers to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney for wasting judicial
resources" when a party made a meritless motion to disqualify. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 at
^[12. In Griffith, the court awarded sanctions to "'compensate for delay, inconvenience
and the expenses resulting from [the attorney's] behavior.'" Id at ^14 (quoting Barnard,
855P.2dat248).
Like traditional courts of general and superior jurisdiction, the ALJ, acting on
behalf of this administrative tribunal, had the inherent authority to impose sanctions
which included dismissal of this case with prejudice, even if no statute or rule explicitly
provided for such an award. Of course, in this case Utah statute allows for dismissal with
prejudice.
Adopting petitioner's reasoning would put respondents at a gross disadvantage.
Dismissal "without prejudice" would allow petitioner the opportunity to re-file a new
Application for Hearing under the Commission's continuing jurisdiction (section 34A-2420) and would allow her the opportunity for another hearing. See Doubletree v.
Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting effect of dismissal
without prejudice). Respondents had prepared for the hearing and had traveled to St.
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George for the hearing on this matter. Similarly, the ALJ had traveled and had reviewed
the hearing file which consisted of hundreds of medical records. To allow a claimant and
her attorney simply to not attend the hearing on this matter and dismiss his or her case
"without prejudice" is, in effect, a dilatory tactic that can only advance the interests of the
petitioner.
If an employer or its carrier fails to attend a hearing, and good cause is not found
to excuse a default, the sanction is an adjudication of the case without participation of that
party. The employer/carrier is not afforded the luxury of essentially "wiping the slate
clean" and engaging in an entirely new hearing when and if they file a Request for
Agency Action. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, respondents
stress that the parties must be treated similarly and fairly. Since an employer/carrier
would not be afforded the luxury of a new hearing if they had engaged in such tactics,
petitioner, having failed to show good cause, should not either. Indeed, respondents
would be prejudiced by dismissal without prejudice since they, the ALJ, and witnesses (if
they are still available) would have to prepare for and travel, at their expense, to St.
George for a new hearing.
Petitioner further claims that the ALJ prejudiced her and committed a "sham"
hearing since the hearing was conducted without her and resulted in dismissal "with
prejudice". She argues that she was prejudiced because the ALJ did not notify her that
the hearing would go forward without her. She also complains that the ALJ, having twice
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denied petitioner's request for a full day hearing, did not respond immediately to
petitioner's subsequent motions for reconsideration.
As noted, the Commission set the matter for hearing in St. George, Utah for April
26, 2005 at 1:00 pm. On January 26, 2005, petitioner's counsel wrote Judge Marlowe a
letter asking for a full day hearing, but indicated that she would not want to give up a
half-day slot if no full day slot was available. On February 7, 2005, the court informed
the parties that the hearing would proceed on April 26, 2005 with an additional day given
later, if needed. On March 11, 2005 petitioner again requested a full day for the hearing.
In a handwritten response dated March 16, 2005 Judge Marlowe again indicated that she
would go forward on the scheduled half-day hearing, with any remaining evidence to be
presented in Salt Lake City, or on the next St. George calendar, if necessary.
On March 16, 2005, Mr. Dabney again wrote Judge Marlowe requesting a full day
hearing. On April 2, 2005, despite the prior rulings by the judge, Mr. Dabney again wrote
to the judge asking for a full day hearing. The ALJ did not respond to these additional
motions from Mr. Dabney since she had already rendered her rulings on two prior
occasions.
Late in the afternoon of April 25, 2005, Mr. Dabney faxed a letter to the Labor
Commission (in Salt Lake City) indicating that his client was withdrawing her
Application for Hearing. No notice was given to Shoney's (or to their legal counsel)
relative to the withdrawal of the claim. On April 26, 2005 Shoney's counsel traveled
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from Salt Lake City to St. George for the scheduled hearing. The judge in this case had
previously traveled to St. George to conduct the hearing (there was no local judge on staff
at the time to hold hearings in St. George), and, therefore, the ALJ was not in Salt Lake
City to received petitioner's faxed notice. At the time of the hearing, the judge informed
Shoney's legal counsel of petitioner's withdrawal of the Application for Hearing.
Shoney's legal counsel asked the court to enter Ms. Duran's default based upon the Labor
Commission's prior ruling in Willard v. Thurston Cable. He also asked to present
witness testimony and to proceed on the merits. As a result of Ms. Duran and her
counsel's failure to obtain leave of the court to withdraw the Application for Hearing, the
court considered Petitioner's notice as a motion to withdraw and, finding no good reason
to grant it, entered petitioner's default and allowed respondents to present testimony
pursuant to section 63-46b-l 1(4) of the Utah Code. Based upon her review of all of the
medical evidence and hearing testimony, the ALJ entered an Order addressing the merits
of this case, ultimately finding in favor of Shoney's. This ruling was later affirmed by the
Labor Commission.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Labor Commission's Order Affirming
ALJ Decisions. Petitioner had the opportunity to participate in a scheduled hearing but
failed to attend. Her attempt to withdraw her Application for Hearing on the eave of trial
in the hopes of refiling at a later date is not allowed by Utah law and should not be
rewarded by this court.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2007.
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and/or Wausau Insurance Company
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